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Abstract  
“The job of the board is all to do with creating momentum, movement, improvement and 
direction. If the board is not taking the company purposefully into the future, who is?” (Sir John 
Harvey Jones) 
With globalization vastly increasing the scale of trade and the size and complexity of 
corporations and the bureaucracies constructed to attempt to control it, the importance of 
corporate governance and internal regulations has been amplified as it becomes increasingly 
difficult to regulate externally.  
Corporate Governance refers to the processes, structures and information used for directing 
and overseeing the management of an institution. A good corporate governance framework 
establishes the mechanisms for achieving accountability between the Board, senior 
management and shareholders, while protecting the interests of relevant stakeholders. It also 
sets out the structure through which the division of power in the organization is determined. 
The role and importance of banks in the financial system and the way banks are funded 
underscores the need for a framework for corporate governance for licensed banks. The 
legislative framework for banks recognizes this crucial role and the risk of malfeasance. Our 
understanding is that by focusing in this direction and being involved directly in this process in 
our organization, by researching in a methodological way and elaborating in depth on the 
subject, We may have a direct contribution to the enhancement of the corporate governance 
structure and practices in our organization as well as an indirect role, through different 
professional associations to the melioration of the system of governance of financial 
institutions in general in our country. We trust that this is a historic period for our country 
aspiring to be integrated soon in the big European Union family.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Banking System in Albania and Governance scene 
The governance system in the Banking sector in Albania has been travelling a long journey of 
transformation for being aligned with the European Union directives for some years now.  
The banking system in Albania is a very recent one. It all started with the collapse of the old 
socialistic system at the early 90s with the privatization of one of the state owned banks. After 
that two Greek banks joined the system with their Branches namely Tirana Bank (part of 
Piraeus Group) and NBG Albania Bank (part of National Bank of Greece). Later on, other banks 
created their presence in Albania by reaching a total number of 16 Banks, two of them having 
Albanian shareholders. With all these changes happening, the need for revision of legal and 
regulatory framework, of which peak was the enactment of the new law on Banks in 2006 and 
the continuous adaptation of the Bank of Albania’s regulations with the best international 
practices, has been more than evident. During the years 2000 to 2008 there has been a huge 
credit growth and the Banks experienced high rates of return on equity and on assets. At the 
time, the number of non-performing loans was at very low levels and there was a growing 
competition for gaining market share in terms of deposits and loans. With the improvement of 
banking regulations, banks are paying more attention to their being in line with that regulatory 
framework, thereby creating specialized functions in their structures in order to meet the 
changing conditions. In addition, being that major part of banks present in Albania are part of 
large banking groups (branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks) many of them are adopting 
the best international practices that go beyond the local legal and regulatory requirements. This 
forward-looking approach toward the best international practices is also imposed byBank’s 
group policies guided by the European Union guidelines. This whole framework has drawn the 
attention of the banking community in Albania while applying the international best practices 
of Corporate Governance. By raising the bar, very good efforts are done towards the direction 
of improving the corporate governance system even in commercial companies. The enactment 
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of the new law “On Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies” as well as the Law “On 
Securities” has been a very good qualitative step to improving the gaps identified even by the 
OECD 6th South East Europe Corporate Governance Roundtable. Despite the efforts undertaken 
by the legislator, there is still much work to be done especially in the improving the judiciary 
system mainly  in dealing with the governance issues. 
As regards the Banking public sector, it is Bank of Albania in its capacity as supervisory authority 
which  covers the activity of the second tier Banks operating in Albania.  
The History of the Bank of Albania and its credit and monetary system in Albania is the history 
of the attempts preceding the foundation of the National Bank of Albania (1925-1944), the 
transformation to the State Bank of Albania (1944-1992), to be concluded in 1992 with the 
Bank of Albania, which enjoys with the attributes of a modern central bank. Albania had its first 
central bank institution in 1913. This institution did not live long due to the political climate of 
the era and to the outbreak the First World War. It recommenced its activity in 1925 under the 
name National Bank of Albania, with the administrative centre located in Durrësi City. 
At the end of 1990, the transition of the political system in Albania reflected vital changes, 
leading the economy to enter into a transforming stage from a state-owned economy in a free 
market one. This changeover gave life to the two-tier banking system in Albania. Thus, on April 
22, 1992, the Bank of Albania was established by the approval of the Law No. 7559, “On the 
Bank of Albania”, which was reviewed latter in accordance with the models taken from the 
western countries and the recommendations provided from the international organizations. 
The Bank of Albania is a fully state owned bank and is accountable to the People’s Assembly of 
the Republic of Albania. The Bank of Albania is managed by the Supervisory Council which is 
composed of 9 members, appointed by the People’s Assembly of the Republic of Albania for a 
term of seven years, eligible for reappointment. 
The Supervisory Council is headed by the Governor, who serves as General Executive Director 
as well, in charge of the day-to-day business of the Bank of Albania. The Supervisory Council is 
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charged with the supreme direction and supervision of the policies, administration and 
operations of the Bank of Albania. In carrying out its functions, the Supervisory Council must 
periodically assess the economic situation, including the monetary, credit and exchange rate 
policies. Its functions and duties, as well as its composition are set forth in the Law On Bank of 
Albania. (Bank of Albania web site) 
The Bank of Albania, within the competences defined by the Law, is independent of any other 
power for the accomplishment of its main objective and in exercising the tasks assigned. As part 
of its mandate to ensure a sound and safe banking system, the Bank of Albania supervises and 
regulates the activity of banks and institutions of the country that perform banking activity. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
Corporate governance is often related with boards as a topic which is debated a lot in 
corporate, association’s environments and media across the world. Nevertheless, more intense 
discussions are national phenomena because of the belief that boards are not to be compared 
on an international plane. The major parts of the subject writers argue that there is a great deal 
to be learned from such comparisons because it seems that boards in different countries have 
more similarities than they have differences.  
This project will make a survey in empirical and theoretical level on the mechanisms of 
corporate governance, focusing, however, on  the Board of Directors practices as one of the 
most important bodies and a key milestone in the corporate governance journey. A 
comparative analysis will be made to the corporate governance system in the Albanian Banking 
industry in general and  in the organization we work in, in particular. While main efforts are 
done in reorganizing and improving both above cited systems through legal and regulatory 
intervention, the final aim is to evaluate and conclude with some real and comprehensive 
recommendations to improve the actual practices related to the Board of Directors in our 
organization. The relevant personal experience and the contribution to this process through the 
professional organizations during the implementation of legal and regulatory changes will be 
subject of further discussion and elaboration. 
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1.3 Methodology 
The overall design of the project is aimed at answering the main research questions. We 
perceived the need to design the project that both fits and is obtained from the question, a 
mixture of mainly qualitative methods, the selected topics, and the research goals. The 
research design is treated as a problem which is considered carefully at the beginning of this 
study. However, it was further reconsidered throughout the development of the project as new 
data and more detailed questions answering the main ones raised.  An interview with the 
representatives of 12 out of 16 Banks in Albania was conducted and the results are shown in 
Appendix 1. 
1.4 Limitations of the Study 
Since the methodology used was mainly empirical, (including review of the annual reports 
published in the web site of Bank of Albania, press releases etc, as well as the relevant 
interview mentioned here above) we noticed in some cases lack of updated information or non 
availability of crucial information which in certain cases limited me even further in terms of 
pointing out and as a consequence in creating an overall view of the governance problems in 
Albania. In addition, given the rather small size of the banking system in Albania as well as the 
boundaries set by the law, certain Research Question could not be verified. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
As we state above, we shall continue by discussing more extensively (i) the Role of the Board in 
a banking organization; (ii) the composition of the Board (iii) the board meetings (iv) the 
directors, the Board independence and the role of the independent directors; (v) Split of Roles 
between CEO and Chairman of the Board; (vi) the Board performance and how they can be 
evaluated by providing an emphasis to the importance of the Boards evaluation and the 
relevant impact in the overall performance of the organization. In addition, the aforementioned 
 8 
 
topics will be discussed in the framework of the existing literature and most recent practices 
recommended by international organizations. The comparative analysis we mention here above 
will be done per each topic discussed. At the end a summary of the conclusions and 
recommendations related to the governance system will conclude this paper. 
 
Chapter 2 
The Role of the Board in a banking organization 
2.1 Introduction 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision calls for the need to study and improve the 
mechanism of corporate governance of Banks. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
suggests in particular a structure which is composed of senior management and a board of 
directors (Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations - February 2006). The 
message the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision launches is the belief that with the 
implementation of sound corporate governance practices the monitoring efficiency increases. 
Moreover the Committee’s conviction is that good corporate governance can ensure a healthy 
financial system in the country. 
 
Being complex organizations, banks have a way of diminishing the capacity of shareholders to 
monitor decision-making process of managers. Banks play an immense role in the payment as 
well as in the functioning of economic systems of the country. In addition, banks are into the 
business of making loans, receiving deposits, and processing information, which makes them 
different in many aspects. For the aforementioned reasons, banks are subject to intense 
regulation, as long as they safeguard the rights of depositors by reducing systemic risk and 
guaranteeing the stability of the payment system.  
The latest papers on the Boards role mainly base their arguments in the best composition in 
terms of efficiency by providing in depth analysis on the functions of monitoring and advising 
(Adams and Ferreira - 2007; Raheja - 2005 ). According to the complexity and the size of the 
organization the need of the advisory role is defined. This calls for an increased number of BoD 
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members. At the same time a persistent governance problem continues to be the need of 
having an enhanced monitoring function. 
Even though the system of corporate governance in banking institutions plays a special role 
because of the complexity and uniqueness of these entities, the issues related to governance 
are not so different compared to the ones in other organizations the business of which is 
related to exchange of goods (Andrés and Vallelado - 2008). Indeed, the main differences 
between the board composition of banks and non-financial firms refer to their regulation and 
supervision. 
Banks are regulated institutions and this regulatory framework plays a very important role 
because systems such as payment and economic development are dependable on financial 
stability of banks. In the banking industry, supervisors and regulators represent one very 
important stakeholder. Anyhow, their objective may not be in line with the one of other 
stakeholders (Diamond - 1984). It is more than understandable that the monitoring function of 
the regulators is one additional external governance mechanism the banks have. However, this 
mechanism may deteriorate the governance problems. [e.g. regulators may impose restrictions 
regarding the ownership structure; discourage competition; set restrictions as to the way 
boards are composed etc. (Prowse -1997; Macey; O’Hara – 2003; Law 9664/2006 “On Banks in 
the Republic of Albania” )]. In addition, regulators might limit the power of markets to discipline 
the banks (Ciancanelli and Reyes – 2001). Since regulators intervene often in many ways, even 
in the shareholding structure of financial institutions, we may say that a conflict of interest is 
generated. This conflict creates doubts as regards the efficacy of supervision system and 
discourages the shareholder to control managers (La Porta et al. - 2002). 
 
2.2 The Role of the Board of Directors in a Banking Organization 
 
The role of Boards of Directors as one of the key mechanism of corporate governance systems 
in financial institutions has taken ground in a framework of intense regulation, limited 
competition, and informational asymmetries caused by the complex nature of banks. In this 
context, the board becomes a very important tool to monitor managers as well as to advise 
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them on the identification and implementation of strategies (Andrés and Vallelado - 2008). The 
specialized knowledge of Bank’s directors in banking area enables them to duly perform their 
monitoring advising duty with efficiency. 
 
As banks are organization having a decision system in which the management is separate from 
the control of decisions, the need for having an effective governance mechanism that can 
prevent with efficiency the expropriation of resources turns into a must. In this framework, 
Boards are considered as a major part of the answer to agency problems in organizations.  
 
The impact that the board of banks has on the corporate value is studied to a great extend. 
Recent research (Andrés and Vallelado -2008; Adams and Mehram - 2008) on banking 
governance suggests that board composition, activity and size affect the effectiveness of boards 
as well as the value of the bank. In disagreement with proposal of non financial studies, the size 
board shows a non-lineal (Andrés and Vallelado -2008), or positive (Adams and Mehram - 2008) 
effect on the value of banks. The findings of the aforementioned studies suggest that bank 
value is strongly related to the performance of boards of directors in their advising and 
monitoring role, still related to boards’ composition. 
Nevertheless, there is no such thing as a perfect composition which can be adopted by banks at 
a second stage because of the different nature, needs and environment each bank is operating 
in (Pearce and Zahra - 1992). The board composition is endogenously determined (Hermalin 
and Weisbach - 2003). In addition, the composition depends not only on internal but on 
external contingencies as well. (e.g. (i) the legal system of the country in which the parent bank 
is established, (ii) ownership structure, (iii)  complexity of the organization as an internal factor 
etc). 
2.2.1 Advisory Board 
One of the main roles of the boards is to ensure that the respective council and access to 
resources and information is duly provided to the Executive management. Such task seems to 
be better performed by more independent and larger boards which may provide more 
connections and much more knowledge, expertise and information (Guest - 2008). Pursuant to 
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previously conducted studies, advisory needs of the bank are positively linked to the size of the 
organization (Kim et al., 2007; Guest – 2008; Coles et al. - 2008;) and its complexity. In addition 
as we mention above in the banking industry board is a unique tool to advice managers in 
identifying and implementing strategies (Andrés and Vallelado, 2008).  
We may infer that the more complex and larger the banks, the greater will be the need for, as 
well as the benefit from the advisory board.  This will lead to having more independent and 
bigger boards (Research Question No. 1). 
 
2.2.2 Monitoring Board 
 
The finding of researchers suggests that the monitoring role is performed with more efficiency 
by independent and larger boards (Raheja - 2005; Guest - 2008;). Some of the benefits we can 
mention are (i) more connections leading to more business; (ii) political influence with a 
supervisory entity etc. Thus, we may assume that banks located in countries with poor 
supervisory authorities need larger and more independent boards.  
In addition, from the studies it is perceived that ownership concentration may work as a 
governance tool that can substitute monitoring role of the Board. On one side, when there are 
fewer shareholders, there are fewer board directors. This will decrease the decision-making 
costs (Kieschnick and Moussawi - 2004) as well as the number of independent directors (Belkhir 
- 2009).  
Following these arguments, we can hypothesize that banks with concentrated ownership do 
not need a monitoring board, hence they may benefit from a smaller and less independent 
board. (Research Question No. 2) 
 
In addition, investing on board with the aim of meeting the needs of the monitoring role will be 
closely linked to the monitoring costs. If the costs are high, then the monitoring configuration 
and, consequently, the monitoring role will be subject to reduction, thus resulting in a 
reduction of the boards’ independence and size. (Raheja – 2005). Thus the monitoring costs 
affect the growth of the organization, by having a negative impact on the size of the board. 
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(Linck et al., 2008; Guest, 2008). The findings do not specifically refer to banks. We have applied 
these findings in the banking sector since we believe that the managerial issues of both sectors 
greatly overlap. As a conclusion, we may assume that growing banks need to increase their 
monitoring costs, which leads to the board becoming less independent as well as smaller in 
size.        
Chapter 3 
The Board Composition 
3.1 Introduction 
According to The Eversheds Board Report “Larger boards were likely to have a lower percentage 
of independent directors, but a higher proportion of directors with ‘relevant industry 
experience’. In this research, a higher proportion of independent directors emerged as a 
common characteristic of better performing companies over the financial crisis”.  
 
Smaller boards seem to be more effective: “Directors point to the fact that a board is a 
collection of people and smaller groups lead to more active engagement of each individual. The 
role the Chair plays is crucial on an effective board, drawing out contributions from the non-
executive directors who possess the relevant skills and creating a culture of constructive 
challenge. For this to be a success, the Chair has to have a close relationship with each of the 
directors, which is made difficult when there are a large number of directors”. (The Eversheds 
Board Report – 2010) 
 
To our understanding, researchers suggest that bank’s boards are to a great extend different 
from those of non financial organizations in terms of bigger size and the increased number of 
independent directors. The mean number in banking industry varies from 16 to 18 directors 
(Andrés and Vallelado - 2008; Adams and Mehram - 2008), which seems to be higher than the 
normal board size  which varies from 11 to 13  for big non-financial companies (Andrés et al., 
2005; Coles et al., 2008).  
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The average proportion of independent directors on the board of a banking organization is 
around 70 to 85% (Andrés and Vallelado - 2008; Adams and Mehram - 2008; Belkhir - 2009), 
which is again higher than the mean of  outsiders varying from 60 to 70% of the total number 
board members in the non-financial firms ( Andrés et al.- 2005; Coles et al.- 2008;). 
In addition, as otherwise discussed here in above, the regulator as an extra governance 
mechanism plays a major role to the differentiation between the compositions of boards in 
financial institutions versus non-financial firms worldwide. 
 
In this context, boards should be configured in an optimal way so as to enhance their advisory 
and controlling role over the management as well as ensure that the bank is compliant with the 
regulatory framework of the country. As a conclusion we may assume that the optimal 
corporate governance mechanisms differ depending on organizations characteristics as well as 
the rest of governance mechanisms and the applicable regulatory system.  
According to this point of view, the independence and optimal sizes of the banking boards are 
related to the bank environment and its peculiarities. In addition, major parts of the above 
studies find that board size has a positive association with bank’s size. (Research Question No. 
3) 
 
 
The key aspect in connection with the composition of a board of directors is related to the 
proportion of independents participating boards and the relevant influence on banks 
performance. According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006 which was 
reconfirmed on October 2010, “the key characteristic of independence is the ability to exercise 
sound judgment after fair consideration of all relevant information and views without undue 
influence from management or inappropriate outside interests”.   
 
Independent directors should have proper knowledge and abilities which are necessary to 
exercise their monitoring and advising role. This will enable directors to avoid or at least 
decrease conflicts of interest between executives and shareholders (Harris and Raviv, in press). 
There is no definite and unarguable evidence on the impact of appointing independent 
directors (John and Senbet – 1998; Bhagat and Black - 2002). On one side, a board of directors 
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which is independent has no conflicts of interest when exercising their monitoring over 
managers role. Therefore, there should be a positive relation between the presence of 
impendent members and bank performance. On the other side, an excessive number of 
independent directors could harm the advisory role of boards since it will lead to an important 
reduction of executive manager’s presence in Boards. Thus, where will be a significant lack of 
internal information in the board room. The studies suggest that executive directors are the link 
between the management and the board. (Adams and Ferreira - 2007; Coles et al. - 2008).  
In addition, an excessively large board can show flexibility problems and may be not functional. 
In other words the directors may loose their incentive to be engaged and duly perform their 
role. 
Therefore we can assume that there is a negative relation between the excessive board size or 
excessive presence of independents and the value of the Bank. (Research Question 4). This 
however, shows the trade-off between disadvantages and advantages in the, excessive 
presence of independents in boards and its size. It is clear that there should be an optimal 
configuration which should fit the respective bank pursuant to its size, nature of doing business, 
environment of operation and other internal factors.  
 
3.2 The Board independence and the role of the independent directors 
 
According to Evershed Report, the empirical evidence suggests that, even though not clearly, 
the increase of the impendent directors is positively linked with the organization performance. 
The findings of the relevant survey suggest that the independence is chosen over the relevant 
industry experience the directors may have. 
 
According to said report, the findings of the survey performed in 241 boars of companies show 
that the companies which performed better had a greater proportion of independents. (refer to 
the Table  1) 
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Table 1 
 
 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006 which was reconfirmed on 
October 2010 “The bank should have an adequate number and appropriate composition of 
board members. Unless required otherwise by law, the board should identify and nominate 
candidates and ensure appropriate succession planning. Board perspective and ability to 
exercise objective judgment independent of both the views of executives and of inappropriate 
political or personal interests can be enhanced by recruiting members from a sufficiently broad 
population of candidates, to the extent possible and practicable given the bank’s size, 
complexity and geographic scope. Independence can be enhanced by including a large enough 
number of qualified non-executive members on the board who are capable of exercising sound 
objective judgment. Where a supervisory board or board of auditors is formally separate from a 
management board, objectivity and independence still needs to be assured by appropriate 
selection of board members” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006) 
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The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance share the view of having a sufficient number of 
independent members seating the board so as for them to ensure that their role is duly 
performed during the decision-making process.  
 
“An enquiring, probing mind is also a requisite attribute. An independent director should not be 
afraid to ask the relevant questions of management and challenge the accepted thinking of 
executives. Independent directors must be prepared to say “no” to management when 
appropriate. However, it is important that issues are deliberated carefully with management 
and other directors and that the decisions of independent directors can withstand scrutiny”. 
 
“The independent director’s role also is not for the faint hearted. Investors rely on their vigilant 
oversight to ensure the responsible management of their assets. Their responsibility is 
significant – and the consequences of failure can be severe, especially for the investors they are 
charged with protecting. They play an important function in safeguarding the financial 
reputation of the company” (The OECD Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable 2007) 
 
3.3 Split of Roles between CEO and Chairman of The Board 
“What you need is complementary but constructive healthy challenge, debate and discussion... 
CEOs, they sometimes drink their own Kool-Aid as the Americans say... and you then end up with 
a lot of groupthink or they stop listening and you need that sort of chairman role to be able to 
challenge the CEO and bring them back down to earth. It is really very important to ensure 
there is a balance of power because absolute power does corrupt absolutely.” 
Mike McTighe, Chairman, Pace plc. 
 
One very interesting point in the debates that have turned out to conclude to a common 
agreement is the so-called spit role of the CEO and chairman of the board of directors. 
Especially in US there are cases where the CEO is acting also as the chairman of the board. In 
this regard the studies suggest that increased difficulties in governance could be expected.  
According to relevant findings during a study on a sample of very large U.S. commercial banks 
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which are publicly traded for the years 1988- 1990 ( Pi and Timme -1993) it is presumed  that  
banks having a CEO holding simultaneously the capacity of the chairman of the board of 
directors are underperforming compared to the ones where such roles are split in different 
persons. On the other hand the findings of another study (Simpson & Gleason -1999) find that 
this dual role of the CEO may result to bring down profitability or even financial distress. 
According to these points of view the CEO concentrating the power of both positions is more 
keened to take less risk so as to ensure a long term in those positions. Their final 
recommendations call for regulator’s intervention in order to prevent financial distress in the 
banking sector. In addition, an organization having a sound corporate governance stem 
including the split role between the CEO and Chairman of the BoD, can have a very good 
potential in having a better monitoring of management. At a later stage another study (Griffith 
et al. - 2002) base their proposal on evidence regarding the insignificance of the relationship 
between both capacities.  
 
Even though the statistical analysis provided by the Eversheds Board Report - 2010 did not 
prove any association between the organization’s performance and that splitting roles among 
CEO and Chairman of the Board, the directors, during a query conducted voted in favour of 
having a divided role. According to this study conducted on 241 Boards, there was no sufficient 
correlation between firms having a split role performance so as to conclude that the companies 
not having a split role were underperforming compared to the ones that have a CEO who is 
playing both roles simultaneously. Results of the survey are shown on Table 2. 
 
The findings on companies which tend to apply a split role were the following: Around 24% of 
US firms that were applying a split role in 2007 were mainly in the banking and finance sectors 
and technology. According to this study this element votes in favour of the lack of a clear 
association between a split role and performance of the share price as during that period Banks 
were underperforming while   technology and software firms were enjoying their peak. 
Most of directors which took place in the relevant survey were in favour of having a split role 
between the CEO and the chairman of the BoD as they were of the opinion that those roles 
were clearly different. In addition, they thought that it was vital to have a Chairman who could 
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challenge the opinion and actions of the CEO. Directors also were of the opinion that the role of 
the Chairman was to run the board and the one of the CEO is that of running the business. 
Another argument supporting their opinion was that the Chairman/CEO roles should be split so 
that less concentration of power may occur. 
Given the above we may assume that even though no strong correlation is provided by the 
relevant literature, the split role can have a positive impact in the value of the firm. (Research 
Question No. 5 
Table2.
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Boards Meetings 
The internal functioning of the board is a very crucial issue on the performance indicators of a 
board and deserves the proper attention by the researches. Indeed studies suggest that there 
are many factors which have a major impact on boards which define their operation. One of 
these elements having a particular importance is the frequency of the boards meetings (Vafeas 
- 1999).  
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During the examination of the boards’ activity someone can come up with arguments that 
support or refute the assumption that there is a positive relationship between the frequency of 
meeting and the performance of the board. During the meetings the board’s members have the 
opportunity to exchange opinions and ideas on how the monitoring role is being carried out 
and also to define future strategies. Consequently, the more frequent the meetings, the closer 
will be the control over managers, thereby ensuring a positive relationship between the 
frequency of meetings and the performance of the Board. In addition, the information 
exchanged in the boardroom, given that banks are complex businesses, impacts significantly in 
a positive way the board’s advisory role. On the other hand, though frequent meetings may 
also be an indicator that the board is reacting to poor performance having that way the latter 
play a reactive role. 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006 which was reconfirmed on 
October 2010: 
 
“The board should maintain, and periodically update, organizational rules, by-laws, or other 
similar documents setting out its organization, rights, responsibilities and key activities.  
The board should structure itself in a way, including in terms of size, frequency of meetings and 
the use of committees, so as to promote efficiency, sufficiently deep review of matters, and 
robust, critical challenge and discussion of issue”.  
Taking into consideration the above discussions, we may hypothesize that the frequency of the 
meetings, if not otherwise provided by the law, is defined by the particularities of the 
environment each organization is operating in. Anyhow, the meetings should be sufficient so as 
the board may duly perform its key roles. The meetings should be attended by sufficient 
quorum as defined in the respective law. However, it is of a paramount importance all the 
members to attend as each of them have a special role to play and contribution to give in the 
board room.  
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CHAPTER 5 
The Board performance and how directors can be evaluated 
5.1 Why Evaluate Boards  
In Basel Committee document on Banking Supervision 2006 which was reconfirmed on October 
2010 is stated: 
“To support board performance, it is a good practice for the board to carry out regular 
assessments of both the board as a whole and of individual board members. Assistance from 
external facilitators in carrying out board assessments can contribute to the objectivity of the 
process. Where the board has serious reservations about the performance or integrity of a 
board member, the board should take appropriate actions. Either separately or as part of these 
assessments, the board should periodically review the effectiveness of its own governance 
practices and procedures, determine where improvements may be needed, and make any 
necessary changes”. 
 
The need for effective board evaluation is identified as one of the lessons learned from the 
global financial crisis. The created economic situation which is deemed to be a result of 
inadequate board functionality indicates the need for increasing the board accountability. This 
is reflected even in the recent local Banking legislative and regulatory changes which 
acknowledge the growing expectation that boards should monitor management as well as take 
full responsibility for the monitoring of their own performance.  
 
The OECD (2009) recommends that “A board evaluation process, conducted with the support of 
independent experts on a regular basis, should be used as a structural tool for monitoring board 
effectiveness and efficiency.” In addition, the Walker Review of Corporate Governance in the UK 
Banking Industry (2009) implies for having a more adequate system of board evaluations and 
better share of information with the stakeholders as to such evaluation. 
 
To assess if a board is performing effectively, there is a need to understand what the board 
should achieve (i.e. the role of the board). As previously discussed a board has two main roles:  
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(i) to monitor and control management (control role); (ii) to provide advice and relations with 
external resources (service role).  
5.2 The reasons Causing Governance to fail  
Governance failures may result mostly in reduction of shareholder wealth. There are also a 
wider range of economic and social consequences that have as final destination the closure of 
businesses, loss of retirement benefits and jobs. Taking into consideration the wide range of 
reasons causing a corporate to fail, it is of an outmost importance to seek for the reasons which 
lie beneath the board performance. There are many categories related to such failure directly 
connected to inadequate performance of one of the following roles such as: (i) strategic and (ii) 
control (e.g. inadequate risk management system), (iii) ethical (risk of having reputational 
damage) and (iv) interpersonal relationship (lack of Board independency). The reason why 
lately a major importance is given to the Board evaluation is that they provide a process for 
boards to identify and isolate sources of failure. In addition, they enable boards to diagnose 
potential issues before the latter reach the crisis point. An evaluation which is well-designed 
and covers both, board as a body  and individual board members evaluation, is likely to raise 
the issue of ethical concerns among some directors in relation to others or management. We 
can use the same argument for failure related to interpersonal relationship. A well designed 
board evaluation can serve to identify any potential issue and encourage discussion leading 
most likely to resolution before they turn into major crises. Board evaluations are not a 
universal solution for all board disfunctionalities. Nevertheless, if evaluations are used on 
regular basis and in a correct way, they may have a major impact on preventing governance 
failure. 
 
5.3 Corporate Performance and Board Evaluation 
 
As we mention above, prevention of corporate failure is not the only responsibility of boards. 
One of the main board focuses is the corporate performance and this fact emphasizes the role 
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of the evaluation of the Boards as strictly related to corporate performance for many reasons: 
(i) It is well known that Boards are held accountable for corporate performance. Therefore they 
have become more proactive in the leadership of the companies which they govern.  Until the 
recent years, the CEO’s, were seen as the only responsible persons for these areas. Today, 
inspired by developments in agency theory (Hendry - 2002), and fuelled by tales of corporate 
excesses such as Hollinger International (Aylmer - 2004) and (Bianco, Symonds, Byrnes and 
Polek - 2002), there is an increased demand from all the stakeholders that boards demonstrate 
leadership and control. (ii) Second, there has been a very important increase lately in the 
shareholder involvement which comes as a consequence of the power increase of large 
institutional investors, who are becoming more demanding of boards.  
 
Institutional investors are pretty convinced that the board can have a direct impact in the 
increase of the shareholder value by providing strategic solutions, guidance and selecting and 
monitoring the CEO as well as by intervening in the event of crisis (Conger, Lawler and Finegold 
- 2001). As a consequence, more than 80 % (eighty per cent) of US and European institutional 
investors are willing to invest more in companies with good governance (Economist Intelligence 
Unit - 2001). The duty for  boards to improve their performance is further emphasized by the 
ability of stakeholders to assess the corporate governance practices of major corporations 
through ratings systems such as those developed by Standard & Poor’s (2003) and the 
Corporate Library (2004), which rate board effectiveness using factors such as board 
composition, director tenure and CEO compensation. 
 
In addition companies such as WorldCom, Enron, and Tyco International, have sealed in the 
peoples memory the failure in corporate governance reflected in the ethics dimension and 
boards, in all cases, seem to be in the firing line. There is an increasing trend for the society to 
put the blame for poor corporate directly on the board. It appears that the stakeholders expect 
that boards should be held accountable for the performance of the companies they govern. 
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For these reasons board and its committees evaluation is becoming a very important tool to 
assist boards in improving their performance. This global trend sees specific board evaluation 
recommendations forming a key component of nearly every major corporate governance 
review or report. For example, the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003) in Australia,  the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010 in the U.K., and the Principles of Corporate Governance (A White Paper 
from the Business Roundtable - May 2002)) in the U.S., the EU Corporate Governance in 
Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies (Green Paper) - Brussels - June 2010, all make 
specific recommendations for the regular review of board performance. 
 
The benefits of having board evaluated are numerous. If conducted properly, board evaluations 
can have a major impact on corporate performance on three levels (i) individual director level, 
(ii) Board level and (iii) on organizational level. Boards which are committed to perform a 
regular evaluation process find benefits across these levels in terms of having improved 
leadership, improved teamwork, greater accountability, greater clarity of responsibilities and 
roles, improved communication, better decision-making, and more efficient board operations. 
In Appendix 2, we show the benefits of board evaluation to the organization, the board as a 
whole and to individual directors. It should be mentioned, however, that such benefits can only 
occur only in case such evaluations and assessments are properly executed. 
 
Chapter 6 
Banking System in Albania 
 
Banking is a very important activity in Albania. The entire 16 commercial Banks are privately 
owned with the share of foreign ownership standing at about 95%. Around 73% of sector's 
foreign assets are held by EU-based banks, while Greek and Italian banks represent more than 
30% of foreign claims. While being generally well-capitalized and liquid (the ratio of liquid 
assets to short-term liabilities stands at well above the minimum regulatory level of 20%), 
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deposits which have increased at a fast pace remain a main source of financing, with the credit-
to-deposit ratio standing at roughly 58% (Sep-12). 
Credit risk remains a major cause for concern, with non-performing loan ratio of around 22.7% 
(Sep 2012). The banking system continues to be increasingly prudent regarding crediting, 
although its balance sheets remain sound and able to encourage credit growth.  
Lending to business remains the major driver of credit growth. Household credit increased at a 
more subdued pace (i.e. 5.3%), well below historical values.  
However, demand for new loans in both segments (households and businesses) is assessed to 
be in low levels compared to previous periods. (Source - Bank of Albania) 
 
The Law 9662 “On Banks in the Republic of Albania” which was recently amended on December 
2011 (hereinafter referred to as “The Law On Banks”) aims at aligning the banking legislation in 
Albania with the Community law. The law is also in conformity with the Basel core principles 
and European Union directives. The law is also in alignment with the Albanian legislation as a 
whole set of legal norm, which, among others provides for supervision of financial activities and 
licensing by other entities, (i.e. the Deposit Insurance Agency and the Financial Supervisory 
Authority). Taking into consideration the major importance of financial entities, the law 
incorporates the best applicable practices of the region and European Union as regards 
corporate governance issues. 
 
Generally it seems that all banks in the Republic of Albania are operating under a regulatory 
framework which includes but is not limited to laws, regulations, procedures and practices that 
determine Corporate Governance. Banks, being compliant with the legal and regulatory 
framework have clear reporting lines, and are well audited by internal and external auditors 
which may have direct access to the Directorate and to the Supervisory Board (Board of 
Directors). 
According to the aforementioned Law, the banks in the Republic of Albania are directed by a 
two tier management system. The Directorate which may be composed by one or more 
directors and constitute the executive direction of the Bank and the Steering Council which is 
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the Supervisory Board of the Bank. The law has defined the Audit Committee as a separate 
body reporting directly to the Steering Council. The Steering Council, having decision-making 
and monitoring attributes is composed by an odd number of members, not less than 5 and not 
more than 9 members. The Steering Council elects from its members one Chairman and one 
Deputy Chairman who presides over and steer the debate during the meetings for the Steering 
Council.  
  
It is a requirement of the Law for the members of the Steering Council, during the performance 
of their duties to comply with the highest ethical standards and act upon sufficient and 
adequate information, in good faith, with the due care and responsibility, fully committed to 
their responsibilities, in the best interest of the safety and sustainability of the banking and 
financial activity, of the clients and their shareholders(Law on Banks in the Republic of Albania). 
  
It is clearly shown here that the legislator has upgraded the Clients as the main stakeholders 
who need to be protected by the power of law. This, we presume, is one of the characteristics 
financial institutions have, given their important role explained herein above. In the Steering 
Council duties and responsibilities section, the law has granted such body with monitoring and 
decision-making authorities which seem to be more strategic and general rather than 
individual. The power of managing the daily business of the bank rests with the Directorate. The 
Steering Council may create Committees for special purposes in order to perform its duties. 
Given that the committees receive the delegation on the topic of concern from the boards it is 
quiet clear that they act as an extension of the boards by facilitating them in the execution of 
their role. The committees generally assume responsibility for seeking and reviewing 
information, forming an opinion and making a recommendation to the board. The efficient use 
of committees can greatly increase the board’s ability to effectively address the diverse areas of 
its mandate. However, it is important to understand that even though the board has delegated 
part of its responsibilities to committees, the board remain responsible for monitoring and 
implementing the relevant issues subject to the delegation.  
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The Organisation we work in has many committees, (Appendix 3 shows a list of committees in 
force, their configuration and frequency of meeting), which help the board during the 
performance of its duties. This is a way for the Board to advise executives (by having in the 
committees people with expertise on the subject) as well as monitor them during their daily 
business.  In addition, instead of having only one General Manager taking decisions, there is an 
entire environment created per each subject, in which the executive (CEO) has very diminished 
probabilities in committing huge mistakes or even abusing with the power.  
In addition, the second chapter of the recently amended regulation of the Bank of Albania “On 
the Core Management Principles of Banks and Branches of Foreign Banks and the Criteria on 
the Approval of their Administrators” deals with the core principles and regulations of a 
responsible and effective management. This chapter aim to strengthen the requirements for 
the managing bodies of the banks. This may be achieved through a major focus on the more 
effective supervision from the Steering Council ( BoD ) and combination of the experience of its 
members in order to ensure a suitable level of qualification of the board of directors. The 
chairman of the board of directors is vested with an important role: i.e. he must promote and 
encourage the critical thinking and expressing of different point of views in the decision-making 
process of the bank. Board of directors should be informed by the directorate on the important 
matters related to banking operations, risk management, implementation of strategies and 
policies, as well as any on deviation from the adopted objectives. For an optimal applicability of 
the core principals the board of directors and the directorate decide to act in close support with 
the control units of the bank.  
 
This chapter also deals with the establishments of different committees of the bank, such as 
risk/s committee, the remuneration committee, nominations committee, ect., which shall 
advise/assist the BoD on specific issues. The bank shall be obliged to publish in their Annual 
Reports the names of the committees established under the BoD, their mandates and their 
composition. Such committees may be established based on the nature, size, complexity of 
operations and risk profile of the bank 
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Moreover according to said regulation remuneration policies, established and approved by the 
BoD shall cover all forms of remuneration, including the salary and other financial and material 
benefits, as well as the benefits from participation in voluntary retirement schemes for the 
following categories of employees: 
a) executive directors of the bank; 
b) employees of the internal audit unit; 
c) employees performing risk- taking jobs (e.g. traders of securities, etc); 
d)  all employees, whose activity is deemed to effect the bank’s risk profile.  
The remuneration is determined based on variable and fixed components. The bank disclose in 
their annual reports the remuneration policies, annual aggregated amounts of compensations 
and rewards of the BoD and executive directors, and their remuneration forms, by explaining 
and backing with arguments the compliance of these remunerations with the risk management 
policies, the risk profile determined by the long term objectives of the bank. 
Having in mind the aforementioned Research Question and discussions on the literature we 
shall continue with the findings on the Albanian banking system as well as with testing the 
Research Question discussed in the previous chapters. 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Findings/Data Analysis and Discussion  
 
Given that the availability of the relevant data was restricted and not published I conducted a 
survey in 12 larger (out of 16 in total) Banks operating in Albania as shown in Appendix 1. The 
survey was done through direct or phone interviews with the department in charge for 
corporate affairs issues. Many times during the interviews the responsible persons seemed 
reluctant of providing all the information as they deemed certain issues were confidential. 
According to the Table of the 12 major Banks in Albania, we can see that the number of the 
Board members in none of the cases has reached its maximum level. This may be explained by 
the fact that in the major part of the cases, as otherwise mentioned here above, Banks are 
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privately owned with the share of foreign ownership standing at about 95% and with a very 
limited (usually one sole shareholder) shareholding structure. As hypothesized earlier herein 
above, banks with concentrated ownership do not need a monitoring board and thus, they may 
benefit from a smaller and less independent board (Research Question No. 2).  
 
In this regard Raiffeisen and BKT are the two larger banks in the Albanian banking system (Table 
of the Main Competitors of Credit Agricole Albania (CAA)). As it shown in the first Table of 
Appendix 1, they have a Board composed by only 5 members, being that way at the very 
minimum level permitted by the Law. The only bank having a complex shareholding structure is 
Banka Credins (BC) the Board of which is composed by 7 members.  
This verifies our aforementioned Research Question regarding the negative association 
between the concentrated ownership and the Board Size. 
Given the market conditions, the Banks in the Republic of Albania are small in comparison with 
the huge groups operating in developed countries. As I mention above, the law sets an upper 
limit of nine members. As we see from the table, none of the banks have exhausted their right 
to use the upper limit set by the law. This finding may be explained even by the fact that  in 
banks having concentrated ownership the board of directors does not justify large monitoring 
costs having in mind their size as well. Once again, the arguments regarding the positive link 
between the Board’s size and the size of the bank stand and are reflected by the regulator even 
in the relevant law by setting a low cap limit (9 members) given the small size of the market in 
Albania(Research Question No. 1). 
One issue which may be seemed by the Appendix 1 on the survey conducted in 12 larger banks 
in the Albanian banking system is the low number of independent members in the Board of 
Directors. With reference to the recent amendments on the Law “On Banks on the Republic of 
Albania” which have entered into force as of 26th of December 2011 it is to be mentioned that 
this change entails for the increase of the number of the Independent Board members from 1/3 
of the total number to the majority (50% +1) of them. Now, as regards the definition the law 
gives for the independent directors we can clearly distinguish that it is expressed in a negative 
(exclusive) way and does not live room for interpretation so as to have clear criteria on which 
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members are considered as independent. More specifically, according to the law the 
Independent members are the ones not having conflict of interest, therefore not being 
connected through private interests with the bank, the shareholders that controls the bank or 
its executive directors. The law gives an explicit definition of the term “Private Interest” which 
is to be taken into consideration by the Bank of Albania during the examination of the 
candidates’ documentations for the approval process. According to the definition of the Law 
the term “Private Interest” means the interests based on or deriving from: 
a) relationships based on wealth or commerce, direct or indirect of any nature; 
b)  any other juridical-civil relationship; 
c)  gifts, promises, favours, preferential treatments; 
d)  negotiations for potential employment or any other form of 
e) relationship constituting a private interest for the director in the 
f) future, after leaving the position as administrator carried out by 
g) him whilst in the position of the administrator of the bank; 
h)  engagement in private activities with the view to profit or any other activities which 
generate income; 
i) family or cohabitation relationship   
(Source: Law “On Banks in the Republic of Albania”) 
 
Given the above, the situations creating conflict of interests through the definition of Private 
interest are all inclusive and do not leave room for practically having independent members. 
However the practise of the Bank of Albania suggests that independent directors should be 
considered the ones not having any of the aforementioned private interests, having a service 
agreement with the Bank specifically for this task (which agreement again, if interpreted 
literally, may be included in the relationship referred to in item (b) herein above).  
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in implementing the Law, it is more than clear that this is a 
typical example of the regulator infringing the interests of the shareholder by not letting the 
latter have the major participation in the board room.  
 
The change of the Law regarding the proportion of the participation of the independent 
members was approved by the Parliament on December 2011. The groups of interest were not 
timely informed on such amendment and therefore the Albanian Association of Banks did not 
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have any time to resist to such change. This was considered to be far by the way such 
amendment should have been done and may trigger a chain reaction by the foreign 
shareholders given that the majority of the banks in Albania are owned by foreign shareholders. 
 
In addition to the above, this change may discourage shareholders for having a presence in 
Albania given that they do not practically control the decision-making process.   
 
By making an analysis of the way the legal and regulatory framework regulates the issue of 
independents, we understand that the law goes beyond the scope of the literature mentioned 
here above in the previous chapter, regarding the advising and monitoring role the board 
performs on behalf of the shareholders. It seems that the independency which the law 
introduces by leaving out the direct or indirect shareholders which control the bank, aims to 
ensure the protection of the interests of other key stakeholders/investors who are the 
depositors.  
 
However, we judge that other particularities of the country are not taken into consideration 
when the amendment of the law was done. The level of informality and the mentality of 
corruption which is a major pelage of the Albanian society persist at considerable levels. By 
leaving the majority of board members to be independent, a fertile environment is created for 
giving birth to circumstances and situations which may expose independent directors to corrupt 
and far from the objective judgment decisions due to implications of other interests. That way 
the interests of the bank may be irreversibly corrupted and therefore even the interests of the 
depositors may be exposed from a potential bankruptcy of the bank. It is true that there are 
other mechanisms observing the decision-making process (i.e. the Board members are elected 
by the General Shareholders Assembly or the supervision conducted by the regulator etc.), which 
we do not think that are efficient or sufficient for ensuring the protection of the Shareholders in 
particular  and bank’s interest in general. 
 
 31 
 
In addition from the Appendix 1 we can see than none of banks is respecting the requirement 
of having a majority of independents in the Boardrooms. This shows a clear resistance of the 
foreign shareholder to the changes of the law because they seem reluctant of losing control 
over the board and increasing the monitoring costs with outsiders. It is interesting the fact that 
the most part of boards have one or two executives in board. From our experience in the 
Banking system in Albania these executives are mostly expatriates coming from the group the 
bank is affiliated to. 
As regards the meetings frequency from the available data reflected in Appendix 1 we can see 
that there is an average frequency of 6 meetings per annum. Again we can see that the two 
major banks Raiffesien and BKT, have the lower frequency of meetings. Thus these banks 
organize only the necessary meetings on quarterly basis so as the management can report to 
the board. We believe that these banks have a lower participation of the board in exercising 
their monitoring and advisory role, while the management seems to have more free hands in 
the running of the business. However being part of larger groups the monitoring process may 
be exercised through the homologue units of the parent bank. 
According to the survey, in certain cases it is declared that they organize trainings for the non-
executive senior management (Directors of Departments/Units), but most part of them do not 
bring any information or avoid responding when it comes to the question on the training of the 
Board members.  In certain cases they mention that the expertise in certain field or the 
experience was the reason they were elected in the relevant position. Therefore they need no 
further experience. As a matter of fact, the Law “On Banks in The Republic of Albania” and the 
regulation “On the Core Management Principles of Banks and Branches of Foreign Banks and 
the Criteria on the Approval of their Administrators” provide for the criterion an administrator 1 
of the bank should comply with. This regulation was recently amended by providing a more 
clear and all-inclusive framework of corporate governance system in the banking industry in 
Albania. The aforementioned regulation stipulates the following: 
                                                             
1 The term “Administrator” includes the members of the BoD and Directorate. 
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“Any individual enjoying a high ethical and professional reputation, with qualification and 
professional experience in management, may be an administrator of a subject (understand 
Bank).   
Qualification and professional experience in management should be sufficient and suitable to 
the nature, sizes and complexity of subject activity, as stipulated in paragraphs 3 and 42 of this 
Article” (Regulation of The Bank of Albania “On the Core Management Principles of Banks and 
Branches of Foreign Banks and the Criteria on the Approval of their Administrators”) 
It is true that the regulatory framework provides for certain criterion a candidate member of 
the board would comply with so as to be elected as one permanent member for the assigned 
term. This is ensured even by the prior approval the Supervisory Body grants before the board 
member becomes effective. Nevertheless there are certain areas which are not covered by said 
regulation.  
                                                             
3. 2  The proposed administrators shall deemed to  own sufficient and suitable qualification and professional 
experience, in the event of meeting the following criteria: `` 
a. hold a university degree or have at least accomplished the programme of second cycle of higher education 
institutes (in the case of administrators being Albanian citizens) in law or economics, and have (work) 
experience of at least 5 (five) years in one of the following sectors:   
i) banking/financial system, 
ii) risk management in the financial markets, 
iii) financial management, 
iv) auditing,  
v) banking/financial supervision, 
vi) legal or academic experience related to financial market; or 
b. hold a university degree in a field different from the legal or economics sciences, and have an experience in 
banking sector, for at least 5 years.   
4. The administrators proposed to hold the position as a member of steering council or of the Directorate, along 
with the criteria set out in paragraph 3 of this Article, shall be considered to own a sufficient and suitable 
managing experience in case they meet at least one of the following criteria: 
a. have held a managing position for at least 3 (three) years in the financial institutions that operate in the 
domestic or cross-border financial market;  
b. have held a managing position for at least 3 (three) years in one of the supervision authorities of the 
banking/financial market in Albania or in an other country;    
have held a managing position for at least 5 (five) years in legal persons different from those mentioned in “a” and “b” 
of this paragraph 
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned arguments, it would be necessary for banks to have a 
clear focus on having Directors trained on governance issues; such includes information on the 
way they should behave in a board room, the encouragement of their critical thinking, the 
transiting of the advice to the managers, their communication, their constructive analysis etc. 
As already mentioned in this paper, The Law “On banks in the Republic of Albania” provides for 
a two tier management system with the Directorate being the executives of the Bank and the 
Steering Council (Board of Directors) the monitoring body which additionally takes strategic 
decisions. In this context, the Executive Director, (who may be the chairman of the Directorate 
or the CEO in the event the Directorate is composed only by one member), cannot 
simultaneously hold the position of the Chairman or that of the Deputy Chairman of the Bard of 
Directors. As it may be easily understood, the Albanian Legal/regulatory framework provides 
for no such institution as the “duality” of the CEO/Chairman which could help us verify our 
Research Question No 5. 
In addition, we can see at the end of the Chapter 6 “Banking System in Albania” that the 
provisions of the Law and the recently amended regulatory framework define the main 
milestones the board of directors should step in so as to duly perform its duty and 
responsibility. We can easily identify the special attention the regulator gives to the role of 
Chairman of the board which is a separate one from that of the directorate (CEO). Therefore we 
cannot verify Research Question No. 5 
 
We discussed thoroughly in Chapter 6 the importance of having the Board evaluated. In the 
Albanian Legal framework this issue is not regulated. It seems that the regulator has not 
intervened in this aspect by letting its adjustment to the policies and practices each bank 
applies. 
Although the recent amendments on the legal and regulatory frameworks were a step forward 
to the enhancement of the regulatory system concerning corporate governance, certain issues 
were left out of regulation. These issues refer to the remuneration policies concerning the 
members of the Board of Directors, training, evaluation etc. 
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From the survey we conducted it appears that the Banks have no practices to perform Board 
Evaluation. Maybe this is a result of the concentration of the ownership in the major part of the 
banking system.  
Even for the issue of remuneration the findings were ambiguous except for some general 
responses which again do not represent the major part of the Banks. According to these 
responses, in general the Board members which have an employment contract with the 
shareholder are not paid additional fees, whilst, the ones that are independent are paid 
through fixed tariffs per meeting. In our bank, since the major parts of the Board members are 
having an employment contract with the direct shareholder, the directors are not being paid 
additional fees for their participation in the Board of the affiliate company. 
According to the survey conducted, only 2 banks out of 12 have  defined the remuneration 
policy for the CEO and 4 of them for the Board of Directors on the basis of short-term results.  
Based on these findings the remuneration policy review is done each year, once the financial 
statements are approved by the Shareholders Assembly. Major part of banks determine CEO 
and Steering Committee remuneration based on long term results ( See  results of the Survey in 
Table 3). 
Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of Albania Survey (2011)  
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusions 
 
As we discussed in this paper the great importance banks have in the country’s economy and 
the complexity of their nature is a good reason for them to be regulated. Even though major 
steps have been done in terms of legal and regulatory intervention in the framework of the 
country’s aspiration to be a member of the great European Union family, there are new 
challenges for the system of corporate governance of banks. On the other hand, continuous 
restriction and regulation is a challenge for banks themselves. For instance, the emergence of 
issues of conflict of interest between the regulator and shareholders we discussed above is a 
key indicator alerting the need of establishing good practices which would keep balances intact, 
by preventing that way the excessive regulation which might be the trigger for generation a 
major corporate governance failure.  
 
In corporate governance, boards of directors of banks are one of the key players in the 
governance of the bank by advising and/or monitoring managers or even by strategically 
leading the bank toward new goals. According to the Research Question mentioned in this 
paper the main characteristics of bank boards such as composition, size etc, reflect the board 
performance or other particularities the bank has (Research Question 3). After introducing a 
general presentation of the Albanian Banking system and the survey on 12 out of 16 of major 
banks we could find we can see that the number of the Board members in none of the cases 
has reached its maximum level. This was explained by the limited shareholding structure. As 
hypothesized earlier herein above (Research Question No. 2), banks with concentrated 
ownership do not need a monitoring board and thus, they may benefit from a smaller and less 
independent board.  
Our findings suggest that the two main banks have a Board composed by only 5 members, 
being that way at the very minimum level permitted by the Law. The only bank having a 
complex shareholding structure is composed by 7 members. This verifies our aforementioned 
Research Question No. 2 regarding the positive association between the concentrated 
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ownership and the Board Size. This overcomes the previous Research Question (at least for the 
banking system in Albania), regarding the positive relation between the bank and the board 
sizes and the need for the advisory board (Research Question No. 1, No. 3).   In addition 
another argument we used for this was that the cost of monitoring are not justified in 
organizations with the concentrated shareholders.  
We additionally assumed in Research Question No. 4 that there is a negative association 
between the excessive board size or excessive presence of independents and the value of the 
Bank  and we showed the trade-off between disadvantages and advantages in the excessive 
percentage of independents and excessive size of the board, as well as that there  should be an 
optimal configuration which should fit the respective bank pursuant to its size, nature of doing 
business, environment of operation and other internal factors. In Albanian banking sector we 
observed that the number of independents is pretty low due to the small size of banks and 
concentrated ownership. Furthermore, the upper limit permitted by the law is only 9. 
Therefore, the size of Boards in Albania is pretty low because is regulated by the law due to 
relatively small size of banks, thus the increase of the size of Boards (up to 9) does not 
jeopardise its functionality and flexibility. As regards the possibility of banks having excessive 
participation of independents, as it is shown in Appendix 1, none of banks is compliant with the 
relevant provisions of the law as we will further elaborate on here below. Again there is no such 
issue as the presence of an excessive participation of independents or an excessive size of the 
Board in the Banking system in Albania, which could help us verify our hypothesis. 
Moreover in this paper we discussed about the independence of the board of directors and the 
positive relationship in the bank’s value (Research Question 1). We raised some issues 
concerning the clarity of the definition of the independent members in the banking legal 
framework in Albania and the conflict caused with the shareholders interest. Our interpretation 
to this problem is that the law is not aligned with the general principles of the Basel Committee 
which states that: “the key characteristic of independence is the ability to exercise sound 
judgment after fair consideration of all relevant information and views without undue influence 
from management or inappropriate outside interests”.   
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We judge that the restriction set by the law as to shareholder participation in the board goes 
beyond the requirement of having the public interests protected. In fact, taking into 
consideration the level of informality and corruption existing vastly mainly in public sector, the 
significantly reduced monitoring of the shareholder this regulation might create, is a fertile 
environment for inappropriate outside interest to grow. Therefore the public’s interests might 
be in danger after all. 
 
The findings from the analysis of the literature and the ones of the banking system in Albania 
lead us to conclude with some recommendations as follows: 
 
 Although Albanian banking sector is characterized by banks with concentrated 
shareholding structure, the need for the banks to increase the number of members up 
to the cap boundary is advised so as to make use of benefits (increased advisory and 
monitoring roles) that such increase may secure to the Banks. This number is relatively 
small and does not work against bank’s flexibility in decision-making process; 
 Banks should increase the number of independents in boards which move will create 
more value to them. We are of the opinion that the shareholder should have the 
majority participation in the board room so as the interests of all stakeholders to be 
better protected. Therefore, there is further need for the relevant provision of the law 
to be changed and adopted to the Albanian conditions; In addition the relevant 
definition of “independent members” should be clarified by the regulator. 
 Given that none of banks had an evaluation policy for the members of the board, such 
policy should be adopted by them so as to make use of the advantages we discussed in 
this paper. 
 Training and clear remuneration policies should be implemented in order to have an 
active and updated board where critical thinking and constructive discussions are the 
main tools for the board to perform their role. 
 Although the regulator has made a step forward in implementing an all inclusive set of 
corporate governance rules in the last amendment of the regulation “On Core 
Management Principles of Banks and Branches of Foreign Banks and the Criteria on the 
Approval of their Administrators”, there is still room for improvement by including other 
areas in such as Board evaluation, remuneration policies etc., which according to our 
opinion, should be regulated as well. However, the particularities of the banking system 
in Albania and the relevant environment banks are operating in should be taken into 
consideration before any regulation enters into force. Banks should be part of an  
interest group to be consulted with when such regulations are being elaborated at pre-
legislative phase. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table of 12 Major Banks in Albania 
 
    RZB BT SocGen ISP BKT BC BPI BU PCB 
Banka 
Veneto BBSH CAA 
1 Members No. 5 7 5 5 5 7 5 7 5 5 7  7 
2 No. of Executives 0 2 2 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 1  2 
3 No. of Independents 0 2 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 3 4  1 
4 Meetings per Annum 4 7-8 
 No 
Info 
No 
Info 4   7-8 
 No 
Info 4 
 No 
Info 
 No 
Info  6 
5 
Performance 
Evaluation 
*Not Applicable. The Only evaluation is done by the Bank of Albania for the board 
as a body not referring to individual assessment. 
6 Remuneration 
*There is no clear information for such issue. In general the Board members which 
have an employment contract with the shareholder are not paid additional fees, 
whilst, the ones that are independent are paid through fixed tariffs per meeting 
7 Board Trainings The trainings are not done 
 
Table of the Main Competitors of Credit Agricole Albania (CAA) 
 
Main competitors 
Loans  
2012 Q3  
Deposits  
2012 Q3 
Branches  
2012 Q3 
ATM's  
2012 Q3 
RZB  23.60% 29.70% 18.50% 24.18%  
BKT 15.60% 19.50% 14.70% 10.28%  
Intesa Sanpaolo (ISP) 8.60% 11.90% 5.60% 6.41%  
SocGen 5.80% 5.10% 7.70% 6.53%  
Banka Tirana 9.80% 7.20% 10.10% 10.28%  
NBG 4.70% 3.10% 4.90% 4.11%  
CAA  4.10% 1.60% 4.00% 4.47%  
Total Banking system 4,117.10 7,094.60 556 827 (Q3)  
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Appendix 3 
List of Committees in CAA 
TYPE  MEMBERS POSITION CONVOCATION 
1  Credit Committee 
1 CEO (Chairman) 
at least  once 
per week 
2 
Deputy GM/ Head of 
Enterprises Unit 
3 COO 
4 Head of Retail Banking 
5 
Head Risk 
Management and 
Permanent Control  
6 
Head of Credit Risk 
Assessment / 
Committee Secretary 
7 
Head of Compliance 
Sector 
1.1 CIB Committee 
1 
Head of Enterprises 
Unit/Chairman 
whenever 
necessary  
2 
D. Head of Enterprises 
Unit /D.Chairman 
3 
Head of Risk 
Management and 
Permanent Control 
4 Head of Compliance 
5 
Head of Credit Risk 
Assessment / 
Committee Secretary 
1.2    Retail Committee 
1 
Head of Retail 
Banking/Chairperson 
at least  once 
per week (not 
functional)  
2 
Head Network 
Division/D.Chairman 
3 
Head of Credit Risk 
Assessment officer 
4 
Credit Risk Assesment 
Specialist / Business 
Loans responsible -
Committee's Secretary  
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2 Internal Control Committee 
1 CEO (Chairman) 
at least 
quarterly 
2 
Deputy GM / Head of 
Enterprises 
Unit/Deputy Chairman 
3 Head Internal Audit 
4 
Head Risk 
Management and 
Permanent Control  
5 
Head of Compliance 
Sector 
6 Head Legal Division 
7 
Head of permanent 
control & operational 
risk officer -secretary  
    8 
Chief Operations 
Officer   
    9     
3 ALCO Committee 
1 CEO(Chairman) 
at least 
monthly 
2 
COO (alternate 
chairman) 
3 CFO 
4 
Deputy GM/ Head 
Enterprises Unit 
5 Head Retail Banking  
6 
Head of Treasury 
Sector  
7 
Head Risk 
Management and 
Permanent Control  
8 
Head of Marketing 
and Communications 
Division  
9 
Emporiki Greece, 
Group Treasurer or his 
representative 
10 
Emporiki Greece, 
Group Risk Div. 
Manager or his 
representative 
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4 NAP Committee 
1 
CEO – Committee 
Chairman  
The frequency 
of the NAP 
Committee 
meetings is set 
based on the 
needs of the 
Business Unit 
that it serves. 
Extraordinary 
meetings are 
convened the 
soonest 
possible after 
the submission 
of a relevant 
request by any 
permanent 
member of the 
Committee, 
through the 
Head of the 
Committee and 
relevant 
approval by the 
Committee 
Chairman. 
2 
8. CIO (or an 
appointed 
representative) 
3 
9. Head of Compliance 
Sector (or an 
appointed 
representative) 
4 
10. Head of Legal 
Division (or an 
appointed 
representative) 
5   
6   
7   
5 Security Committee 
1 CEO/Chairman  
at least 
quarterly and 
as required 
2 
  
Deputy GM/ Head of 
Enterprises Unit 
 
3 COO  
4 Head of Retail Unit 
5 
Head of Information 
Security/BCP Manager 
6 
Head Risk 
Management and 
Permanent Control  
7 Head of IT Division  
8 
Head of 
Administrative 
Services Sector  
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9 
Head of Internal Audit 
(Advisor role) 
6 Purchasing Committee 
1 CEO (Chairman) 
when needed 
2 
COO-permanent 
member  
3 
CFO-permanent 
member  
4 
The Head of the Unit 
in charge for the 
expenses of the 
specific subject 
7 
HR Committee*                       to 
be approved during Q1, 2013 by 
the Board of Directors 
1 CEO (Chairman) once per month 
2   
3 Head HR  
8 
Customer Complaints 
Committee 
1 CEO 
Monthly basis 
2 COO 
3 DGM/Head EU 
4 Retail Unit Head 
5 
Head of Compliance 
Sector 
6 
Busines 
Control&Support of 
Network, Head 
  
7 
CFO,HR,Risk,LU in 
specific case  when the 
presence is necessary 
9 Audit Committee 
1 Chairman 
at least four 
time per year  2 
in process of aproval 
by Central Bank 
3 
Head Internal Audit 
(Secretary) 
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10 Sensitive Affairs and Provisioning Committee 
1 CEO (Chairman) 
Quarterly 
2 
 Deputy GM / Head of 
Enterprises Unit  
3 COO 
4 
Head Risk 
Management and 
Permanent 
Control/Deputy 
Chairman  
5 Head Legal Division 
6  CFO 
7 Head of Recovery  
8 Head of Retail Unit 
  
Anti-Fraud Committee  
1 
Deputy General 
Managers 
at least 
quarterly and 
as required 
  
2 
Head Risk 
Management and 
Permanent Control 
/Deputy chairperson 
  3 Head of Internal Audit 
  4 COO 
11 5 Head of Retail Unit 
  6 
Head of Marketing & 
Product Development 
  
7 
Operational Risk and 
Permanent Control 
Officer  
  8 Head HR  
  9 Head Legal Division 
  10 Head of IT Division  
  11 
Head of Retail 
Network Division 
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  12 
Head of Compliance 
Sector 
    13 Committee secretary    
    1 CEO(Chairman) 
when needed 
    
2 COO 
  Assets Management Committee  
3 
Head Risk 
Management and 
Permanent Control  
    4  CFO 
12   5 Head Legal Division 
    
6   
  
13 IS Committee 
1 CEO  
at least 
quarterly and 
as required 
2 
 Deputy GM / Head of 
Enterprises Unit  
3 
CIOO (leader of the 
committee) 
4 COO/D Chairman 
5 Head of Retail Unit 
6 
Head Risk 
Management and 
Permanent 
Control/Deputy 
Chairman  
7 CFO 
8 
Information Security 
Oficcer 
9 
Head of 
Organization(Secretary 
of Committee 
10 Head of IT 
14 Risk/Accounting Data 1 Deputy Finance Monthly basis 
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Reconciliation Committee Division Manager / 
Chairman 
and as required  
2 
Head of Permanent 
Control & Operational 
Risk Sector/ Member  
3 
Head of Accounting & 
Tax Sector / Member 
4 
Head of Reporting 
Sector / Member 
5 
Head of Risk Reporting 
& Analysis 
Department - Risk 
Management Sector / 
Member 
6 
IT in case specific or 
other issues/projects 
will be discussed 
 
 
